REFLECTIONS

ON

Mr. CLARK's Second Defence

OF HIS

LETTER

TO

Mr. *DODWELL.*

——Vimq; omnem eam, quâ vel agamus quid, vel ſentiamus, in omnibus Corporibus vivis æqualiter eſſe fuſam, nec ſeparabilem eſſe a Corpore, quippe quæ nulla ſit, nec quicquam, niſi corpus unum & ſimplex, ita figuratum ut temperatione naturæ vigeat & ſentiat: affirmat Dicæarchus apud Cicer. Tuſc. Quæſt.

Nos autem animam corporalem & hic profitemur, & in ſuo volumine probamus, habentem proprium genus ſubſtantiæ, ſoliditatis, per quam quid & ſentire & pati poſſit. Tertullian. de Reſurrectione Carnis.

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M. DCC. XI.

Reflections *on* Mr. Clark's *Second Defence*, &c.

If the Reader is not already tir'd with the continuance of this Diſpute, concerning the *Poſſibility of Matter's Thinking*, I will preſume ſo far on his Underſtanding and Candour, as (without endeavouring to lead him into my ſide of the Queſtion, by making a previous Judgment of Mr. *Clark's Second Defence of his Argument, made uſe of in a Letter to Mr.* Dodwell, *to prove the Immateriality and natural Immortality of the Soul*) to proceed directly to the Queſtion it ſelf, after I have perform'd a piece of Juſtice to Mr. *Clark* and the Reader, by acknowledging, that in my *Reply* to Mr. *Clark*'s former *Defence*, I did omit a Line in citing his Anſwer to my firſt Objection; which, whether it was owing to *a Fault of the Preſs*, or to my Negligence in tranſcribing, I cannot ſay: but I can aſſure the Reader, it was out of no deſign to give *a diſadvantageous repreſentation of his Senſe*, and I hope he will be induc'd to believe ſo, when he conſiders that I made no manner of uſe of that *Repreſentation* to the diſadvantage of his Argument, and to excuſe me in the ſame ingenuous manner that Mr. *Clark* has done. 2d Def. p. 3.

The Queſtion is, Whether a Syſtem of Matter can have a Power of Thinking, or an individual Conſciouſneſs ſuperadded to it, or flow from any modification of that Syſtem.

By the term *Individual*, when applied to *Conſciouſneſs*, both Mr. *Clark* and I underſtand *one Conſciouſneſs*, in oppoſition to a multitude of diſtinct *Conſciouſneſſes*. 2d Def. p. 4, 5, 6.

By *a Power of Thinking*, I did underſtand on this occaſion *Actual Thinking*, and not *a Capacity of*

Reply, p. 10. *Thinking*; 'for elſe, as I ſaid, Conſciouſneſs could 'not be properly employ'd by Mr. *Clark* to ſignify the ſame thing with a Power of Thinking.' But to this ſtate of the Queſtion Mr. *Clark* excepts by ſaying, *That he can ſee no reaſon for ſuch a nicety of diſtinction: For*, ſays he, *the thing to be prov'd being this, that a diviſible Subſtance is not capable of a Power of Thinking; What difference can it make, whether by a Power of Thinking I underſtand actual Thinking, or a capacity of Thinking? For* he *preſumes, I will not deny, but whatever is prov'd incapable of actual Thinking, is alſo prov'd incapable of a Capacity of Thinking; and whatever is prov'd incapable of a Capacity of Thinking, is alſo prov'd incapable of actual Thinking.* And further to ſhew the *needleſſneſs* of diſtinguiſhing between *actual Thinking*, and *a Capacity of Thinking*; he ſays, *The Reader may underſtand* the term Conſciouſneſs *indifferently for either a Capacity of Thinking, or actual Thinking, or the reflex act of Thinking; becauſe* his *Argument proves univerſally, that Matter is neither capable of the reflex Act, nor of the direct Act, nor of the Capacity of Thinking.*

2d Def. P. 3, 4.

2d Def. 4.

1. Now allowing this to be as Mr. *Clark* repreſents it, what occaſion was there for contending with me about the Senſe I fix'd to the Terms, *Power of Thinking* and *Conſciouſneſs?* All that could be hop'd for by him in this Diſpute, is, by his own account of the matter, as well attain'd by my underſtanding *a Power of Thinking* or *Conſciouſneſs*, in that Senſe wherein I underſtood thoſe Terms, as if either of them ſtood for three Significations at once. For if his *Argument proves univerſally, that Matter can neither have the direct Act, nor the reflex Act, nor the Capacity of Thinking*; And that *whatever is prov'd incapable of actual Thinking, is prov'd incapable of a Capacity of Thinking*: And I may add likewiſe, and that whatever is prov'd incapable of *actual Thinking*, is prov'd inca-

2d Def. P. 4.

P. 3.

incapable of the reflex Act of Thinking: Have I not then underſtood him, in a Senſe that anſwer'd all the Ends and Purpoſes of his Argument?

2. But there's ſtill the leſs reaſon, if poſſible, to diſpute with me about this matter; becauſe he expreſly ſays, *The Reader may underſtand* the term Conſciouſneſs *indifferently in all or any* of the before-mention'd *Significations.* So that I have taken but the ſame liberty he allows to every other *Reader*; and till I am ſhown a difference between an Anſwerer and a *Reader* in this reſpect, I ſhall think my ſelf juſtify'd by what Mr. *Clark* allows to his *Reader.* But that the Reader may ſee the ground of his Complaint againſt me, and that I may do Mr. *Clark* juſtice, I will cite the whole Sentence that he uſes on this occaſion, becauſe it ſeems to me to contain one of the niceſt diſtinctions that ever I met with. Says he, *The Reader need not trouble himſelf with the nicety of Diſtinction, between a Capacity of Thinking, actual Thinking, and the reflex Act of Thinking, but may underſtand Conſciouſneſs indifferently in all or any of theſe Significations.* Which is as much as to ſay, that the Reader need not underſtand Conſciouſneſs indifferently in any of the before-mention'd Significations, and yet may underſtand it indifferently in any of theſe Significations: for I cannot ſee, but that whoever underſtands *Conſciouſneſs* in any one of thoſe Significations, muſt uſe that *nicety of Diſtinction* he complains of whether he will or no: For by reſtraining Conſciouſneſs to any *one* of thoſe Significations, he neceſſarily diſtinguiſhes that *one* from the other *two.* And therefore I muſt own, I cannot ſee the leaſt reaſon Mr. *Clark* had to blame me for a *needleſs nicety of Diſtinction*, when he allows me to underſtand Conſciouſneſs indifferently in three Significations; one of which I did aſſign as my Meaning or Idea of that Word. 2d Def. P. 4.

3. Since

3. Since then it is evident that I have underſtood him in a Senſe that anſwer'd all the Ends and Purpoſes of his Argument, and in a Senſe wherein he allows his Reader to underſtand him; he ought not to have ſuppos'd ſuch a Reaſon as he is pleas'd to aſſign for me, why I diſtinguiſh between actual Thinking, and a Capacity of Thinking, as he does, when he ſays, *That* he *cannot ſee any reaſon (unleſs it were to perplex the Reader with a new Queſtion, Whether the Soul always actually thinks or not, which is wholly foreign to the matter at preſent in diſpute) why* I *ſhould affirm*, 'That Conſciouſneſs could not be properly em-'ploy'd by Mr. *Clark* to ſignify the ſame thing 'with a Power of Thinking, unleſs by a Power 'of Thinking be underſtood not Capacity to 'think, but actual Thinking.' I ſay, he ought not to have aſſign'd ſuch a Reaſon for me; for if I have underſtood him in one of thoſe Senſes that he allows his Reader to underſtand him in, and by conſequence acknowledges that I do not *perplex* the Reader with a new Queſtion, by underſtanding *a Power of Thinking* to ſtand for *actual Thinking*, but that I keep my ſelf to the old Queſtion by underſtanding him in that manner; What ground could he have to imagine, that I had any deſign to *perplex* the Reader with a new Queſtion, but by either making the ſame Queſtion to be both new and old, or two different Queſtions, one and the ſame Queſtion? I ſhall not preſume to enter ſo far into his Thoughts, as to ſay, That tho he acknowledges his Argument to be directed againſt the Senſe in which I underſtand *Power of Thinking* and *Conſciouſneſs*, and that all that he requires from his Argument, equally follows from Matter's being prov'd incapable of actual Thinking, as if I underſtood him in any other Senſe that he can contend for; I ſay, I ſhall not preſume to enter ſo far into his Thoughts as to tell the Reader,

2d Def. P. 3.

der, that I can ſee no reaſon for his imagining that I had any deſign *to perplex him with a Queſtion foreign to the matter*, (unleſs it be to *perplex* this Diſpute in that part where it is moſt neceſſary to be clear) but chuſe rather to demand a reaſon of his Conduct, when I cannot aſſign a good one for him. And that is what I think I had reaſon to expect from him, if he means any thing by attributing *Candour and Ingenuity to what I have written* beſides mere Compliment, whether I could have given a good Reaſon or no for underſtanding Conſciouſneſs to ſignify in this Diſpute *actual Thinking*, and conſequently for diſtinguiſhing between actual Thinking and a Capacity of Thinking. 2d Def. p. 2.

4. But to give Mr. *Clark* and the Reader full Satisfaction on this Head, I will ſhow that the whole Diſpute turns upon that Diſtinction, That my Objections were entirely founded on that Diſtinction, and that Mr. *Clark*'s not attending to it has render'd all his Anſwers foreign to the Matter of my Objections. Mr. *Clark* had ſaid, *It is plain, unleſs Matter were eſſentially Conſcious — no Syſtem of it in any poſſible compoſition or diviſion can be an individual conſcious Being.* Now upon my Principles, and I ſuppoſe the Principles of all thoſe who ſay a diviſible Being may have a Power of Thinking, it is impoſſible to give any Anſwer at all to this Propoſition, but by reſtraining the Senſe of the term *Conſciouſneſs:* becauſe on ſuppoſition, that Conſciouſneſs ſtands at one and the ſame time for the direct Act, for the reflex Act, and for the Capacity of Thinking, what is meant by thoſe words cited out of Mr. *Clark*'s Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, will be allow'd by me to be partly true and partly falſe. I grant the reaſoning to be good thus far, That if Matter be not made by God capable of Thinking, or eſſentially conſcious in that Senſe, *That no Syſtem of it in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion can be an individual conſcious Being*; Letter to Mr. D. p. 33.

Being; that is, No Motion whatever can give Matter a Capacity of Thinking: and only deny them to be true, underſtood after this manner, That unleſs all Matter did actually think, or was eſſentially conſcious in that Senſe, no Syſtem of it in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion can actually think. So that what I maintain is in ſhort this, That either Matter was made originally capable of Thinking, or may be made by God capable of Thinking after its beginning to exiſt; and notwithſtanding that no Part of it may really or actually think, yet by virtue of that Capacity ſome Syſtems may by Compoſition and Diviſion become Subjects of thinking. All that I ſuppoſe ariſes new from Compoſition and Diviſion is nothing elſe but a new Operation or actual Thinking; and therefore my Principles led me to underſtand by a *Power of Thinking*, actual Thinking, and conſequently to diſtinguiſh between actual Thinking, and a Capacity of Thinking. And had any end of Truth been to be ſerv'd by further diſtinguiſhing, I had taken the ſame liberty to have ſpoken of *Conſciouſneſs in the moſt ſtrict and exact Senſe of the Word, as it ſtands for the reflex Act of Thinking, by which I know that I think* as I have now done in uſing it for *actual Thinking*.

2d Def. p. 4.

5. As I could not make any Objections to Mr. *Clark*'s Argument but by diſtinguiſhing between *actual Thinking* and a *Capacity of Thinking*; ſo in fact my firſt Objection is grounded on that Diſtinction. I ſpeak directly of *Thinking* as an *Operation*: And when I ſay, 'that Matter of Fact is ſo plain 'that a Man cannot turn his Eye but he will meet 'with material Syſtems, wherein there are Indi-'vidual Powers which are not in every one, nor 'in any one of the Particles that compoſe them 'when taken apart and conſider'd ſingly, and in-'ſtance in a Roſe that produces in us the Senſa-'tion of Sweetneſs; I plainly ſuppos'd the Mat-'ter,

Reply 8.

ter of which thoſe material Syſtems conſiſted, eſſentially capable of thoſe Individual Powers which are obſervable upon the different diſpoſition of their Parts, and likewiſe the matter of which a Roſe conſiſted eſſentially capable of producing that Senſation in us; and that it was from the compoſition of that matter, of which it did conſiſt, into the Form of a Roſe, whence the particular Operation that cauſes our Senſation ariſes.

Sect. 1. In order to prove that Conſciouſneſs could not inhere in, or reſult from a diviſible Subſtance, Mr. *Clark* enumerated all the poſſible Powers of Matter under three Heads.

1. *Powers really inhering in the Subject to which they are uſually aſcribed, ſuch as Magnitude and Motion, which are Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the ſame kind.* 1ſt Def. p. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.

2. *Modes produc'd in ſome other Subject, as for inſtance, the Sweetneſs and Colour of a Roſe, which are vulgarly look'd upon as Individual Powers. But this,* ſays he, *is only a vulgar and groſs Error.*

3. *Certain Effects or Powers that do not properly reſide in any Subject at all, ſuch as Magnetiſm, and Electrical Attractions.*

From whence it follows, that according to Mr. *Clark* no Powers can inhere in Matter, but ſuch Powers as Magnitude and Motion, which are only Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the ſame kind: And therefore *if Conſciouſneſs can inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt neceſſarily be the Sum and Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts, and ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes as there are Particles of Matter of which the Syſtem conſiſts, which he ſuppoſes will be granted to be very abſurd.* 1ſt Def. p. 9. Now in anſwer to this Argument I ſaid, 'That it was nothing elſe but *Argumentum ad Ignoratiam*; for by enumerating his Reply, p. 12.

'three ſorts of Powers or Qualities of Matter,
'and ſhowing that the two laſt are improperly
'called Powers or Qualities, he does ſuppoſe that
'a Syſtem of Matter has and can have only Pow-
'ers of one ſort or kind, ſuch as Magnitude and
'Motion, which are only the Sums and Aggre-
'gates of Powers of the ſame kind: which what
'is it elſe but to argue, That becauſe we know
'of no other Powers in Matter of a different
'kind from Magnitude and Motion, therefore it
'has and can have no other Powers of a different
'kind?'

2d Def. p. 7. But Mr. *Clark* ſays, *If a Disjunction be complete (as that in which* he *enumerates the ſeveral ſorts of Powers of which Matter is capable, either is; or elſe* I *ought to have prov'd that another Member could be added to it, to ſhow that it was not) it contains in it all the poſſible Particulars, as well the unknown, as thoſe that are ever ſo well known.*

1. It is very true, If a Disjunction be complete, it muſt contain in it all poſſible Particulars both known and unknown; but this amounts to no more than to ſay, that if a Disjunction be complete it is complete, and does by no means reach the Queſtion, which is, how he can know that his Disjunction is complete (if ranking all the true and proper Powers of Matter under one Head can be called a Disjunction) when he produces no Proof that his Heads are rightly diſtributed, and do contain under them all the poſſible Powers of Matter both known and unknown; and till he can prove that, he can never clear his Argument from being *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.* He therefore miſtakes the Objection of *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*, when he ſays, *That his Disjunction either is complete, or elſe* I *ought to have prov'd that another Member could be added to it to ſhow that it was not:* For the Nature of that Objection does not oblige me to add another Member to his Disjunc-

tion,

tion, but obliges him to prove that another Member cannot be added to his Disjunction; for unleſs Mr. *Clark* can prove it impoſſible for another Member to be added to his Disjunction, he can never know that another Member cannot be added to it, and conſequently an Argument drawn from a Disjunction which is not demonſtrated to be complete, is purely an *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*; and to put me upon adding another Member to it, is to put me upon more than my Objection oblig'd me to, nay is inconſiſtent with the Nature of ſuch an Objection, and mixing things that are foreign together.

2. But I did not only tell him that his Argument was an *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*, which was ſufficient to overthrow a precarious Disjunction, but did inſtance in ſeveral Powers of Matter that did not fall in with his Disjunction. I inſtanc'd particularly in the Power of the Eye to contribute to the Act of Seeing, (for tho I certainly think the Eye to be the Organ of Seeing, as I do the Noſe of Smelling, or the Lungs of Breathing, and I may add the Brain of Thinking, yet I attribute in my Argument in this place no more to that Syſtem of Matter call'd the Eye, that I might not beg the Queſtion between us, than ſuch undoubted matter of Fact as I think no one will deny, *viz.* that by the Diſpoſition of its Parts it is operated on in a peculiar manner by external Objects, and that it does contribute by its own Operation towards the Act of ſeeing) as an Operation of a Syſtem of Matter, that did not inhere in its Parts in the ſame ſenſe with Magnitude and Motion in Body: 'for divide and vary 'the Parts of Matter as much as you will, there 'will be Magnitude and may be Motion; but 'divide or vary the leaſt part of the Eye, and 'the Power of contributing towards the Act of 'Viſion is intirely at an end.' *Reply* p. 17.

But that I may explain my ſelf more fully on this Head, I ſhall obſerve, that not only the Power of the Eye to contribute towards the Act of ſeeing, is a Proof that there are Powers in Syſtems of Matter that inhere not in the parts of thoſe Syſtems ſingly conſider'd, but almoſt every thing we ſee, feel, hear, taſte or ſmell, may convince us of the Exiſtence of ſuch Powers. Does not a muſical Inſtrument, by being operated on in a peculiar manner, operate on us again, and produce in us ſeveral agreeable Senſations? And is not that *Power or Ability to be acted on by us, and to act on us*, peculiar to the Modification of that Body, and not the Reſult of Powers of the ſame kind, ſince there are parts of that Syſtem of Matter abſolutely neceſſary to the Continuance of that Power in them which produces our Senſations? For as the Strings of a Violin are not ſufficient of themſelves, ſo neither are the remaining parts of that Inſtrument to produce in us thoſe harmonious Sounds that are caus'd by the whole Syſtem of that Matter, being modified into that peculiar Form.

What are particular Figures in Bodies, ſuch as Roundneſs or Squareneſs, but Qualities or Powers in Bodies that are not the Sum of Powers of the ſame kind? For divide a round Body into what number of Parts you pleaſe, and it will never be found to conſiſt only of round Parts, no more than a ſquare or cubical Body will be found to conſiſt only of ſquare or cubical Parts; ſince a round Body may by the motion or alteration of its Parts become cubical, and a cubical Body by the motion or alteration of its Parts become round.

2d Def. P. 25. But Mr. *Clark* ſays, *That Seeing in the Eye is not a real inherent Quality, but merely ſituation of Parts and Pores, ſo as to be the occaſion of an Effect wholly extrinſical to it ſelf, an Effect produc'd in ſome*

ſome other Subſtance by Rays tranſmitted thro the Pores of the Eye; and is one of thoſe Powers, &c. *rank'd under his third Head of Powers,* viz. *an Effect that does not reſide in any Subject at all.*

In this Paragraph Mr. *Clark* ſeems to confound his ſecond and third Heads together, by making the Power of the Eye to ſee to be both *an effect produc'd in ſome other Subject*, and *an effect reſiding in no Subject at all* at the ſame time. But I will ſhow Mr. *Clark*, that it is neither the one nor the other; for what is *the Tranſmiſſion of Rays* in a peculiar manner, but an Operation particular to the Parts of the Eye under ſuch a Modification? And is there not then a peculiar Motion of the Eye whereby the Soul is made capable of ſeeing Objects tranſmitted, which Operation or Mode of Motion intirely ceaſes upon the leaſt alteration of the Parts? Is not the whole Being affected, and does it not act in a different manner from each of its Parts ſingly conſider'd, and from the whole Syſtem under another Modification? Now it is that manner of acting peculiar to the Structure of the Eye, that I call the *Power of the Eye* (which does not inhere in the Parts of the Eye in the ſame ſenſe that it inheres in that whole Eye) in the Idea whereof is not only contain'd an Effect wrought in another Subject, viz. *Actual ſeeing in the Soul*, but an Operation on the Subject of Seeing: as I ſuppoſe Thinking not to be merely an effect wrought on another Subject, *viz.* Ideas and the Images of things, but is likewiſe the Action of the Brain, or Spirits of the Brain on thoſe Ideas and Images of things. And therefore if the Power of the Eye to contribute towards ſeeing be a Mode of Motion peculiar to that Syſtem of Matter, and Motion be allow'd truly and properly to inhere in the Subject that moves; then the Power of the Eye to contribute towards ſeeing, is neither a Mode pro-

produc'd in another Subject, nor an Effect reſiding in no Subject at all. But to this Inſtance, and all other Inſtances that I have mentioned before, it may be anſwer'd, That the Power to contribute towards ſeeing, and the Power of a muſical Inſtrument to produce an harmonious Sound, being really nothing elſe but an Impreſſion of a particular kind or mode of Motion which thoſe Syſtems are capable of receiving from the particular Diſpoſitions of their Parts, and the Actions of other Beings on them; and Roundneſs or Squareneſs being nothing elſe but Modes of Figures, the Power of the Eye, of a muſical Inſtrument, and the Qualities of Roundneſs and Squareneſs are only the Sums of the Motions and Figures of the Parts, or Sums of Powers of the ſame kind, and conſequently fall in with the Powers of Matter that Mr. *Clark* rank'd under the firſt Head of Diſtribution of the Powers of Matter, and are defective Similitudes to prove the real Exiſtence of ſuch Powers as inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without inhering in the Parts of the Syſtem ſingly conſider'd.

This, if I miſtake not, comprehends the intire Strength of all that can be ſaid againſt my Inſtances; and an Anſwer to it will ſet this Diſpute in a clearer Light than poſſibly it has hitherto been, and perhaps give Mr. *Clark* particular Satisfaction with relation to the Inconcluſiveneſs of his Argument, by detecting what I conceive has particularly impos'd upon him. In anſwer therefore to this Objection, I own, ſince I undertook to give a Proof drawn from matter of Fact, that there are Individual Powers peculiar to Syſtems of Matter, without belonging to each of their Parts ſingly conſider'd, I am oblig'd either to clear thoſe Inſtances I have given, or aſſign other Inſtances, or elſe own that there are no known Powers in Matter, but what

are

are the Sums of Powers of the ſame kind. And therefore to ſhow that my Inſtances are pertinent, I diſtinguiſh between *Numerical Powers* and *Generical Powers*. By *Numerical Powers* I underſtand ſuch Powers as Motions and Figures of the ſame Species. The Power of the Eye to contribute towards ſeeing, is a Species of Motion, and the Roundneſs of a Body is a Species of Figure. By *Generical Powers* I underſtand all the ſeveral Species of *Numerical Powers*; as Motion ſignifies all the various Species of Motion, and Figure all the various Species of Figure. Now if the Reader will be pleas'd to apply the foregoing Diſtinction, he may ſee that the whole of the Objection is founded on an *Equivoque* of the Terms, *Powers of the ſame kind*: for if *Powers of the ſame kind* be underſtood *generically*, then I do agree that the known Powers of Matter are nothing elſe but the Sums of Powers of the ſame kind; that is, the Figure and Motion of a Body conſiſt of the Figures and Motions of the Parts. But if the Terms *Powers of the ſame kind* be taken *numerically*, (that is, as Powers really exiſt) then there are Powers inhering in Syſtems of Matter that are not the Sums of Powers of the ſame kind: as the Roundneſs of a Body is not the Sum of the Roundneſſes of the Parts; nor the Power of a muſical Inſtrument to cauſe an harmonious Sound, the Sum of Powers of the ſame kind in the Parts ſingly conſider'd. I ſhall now apply what I have ſaid to Conſciouſneſs, or a Power of Thinking; and to make my ſelf the more intelligible, will ſuppoſe Conſciouſneſs (of whoſe Nature I may be ſuppos'd ignorant) to be a Mode of Motion, and not a Mode of ſome unknown Power; and the rather, becauſe I have to do with a Gentleman that underſtands the Rules of arguing too well, to impute that to me as my Opinion, which I only take the liberty to ſuppoſe,

poſe. If Conſciouſneſs then be conſider'd as a Mode of Motion, as Roundneſs is a Mode of Figure, it will be ſo far from being true, that if Conſciouſneſs inheres in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt be the Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts, that it will be a Contradiction to make it the Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts, as it is a Contradiction to make Roundneſs to conſiſt in the Roundneſſes of the Parts: tho I would readily grant, that was Conſciouſneſs a generical Power like Figure and Motion, it would be likewiſe the Sum and Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts; and ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the Syſtem conſiſts; which I do allow to be very abſurd. What I have now ſaid I think ſufficient to ſhow, that my Inſtances to prove that there are Powers in Matter that are not the Sums of Powers of the ſame kind, were rightly choſen, and conſequently to ſhow that Conſciouſneſs, of whoſe Nature we are ignorant, may inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without being the Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts. Wherefore I take the liberty to conclude, that beſides ſuch generical Powers, as Motion, Figure, *&c.* that Mr. *Clark* only conſiders under his firſt Head (which according to him contains all the true and proper Powers of Matter) there are Numerical (or if Mr. *Clark* pleaſes, Individual) Powers, ſuch as particular Modes of Motion, and particular Modes of Figure in certain Syſtems of Matter, which he has omitted the conſideration of: for had he conſider'd *Conſciouſneſs* as a Mode of ſome Power in Matter, he could never have ſaid, *If Conſciouſneſs could poſſibly be a Quality inherent in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt likewiſe neceſſarily be the Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts*; but the contrary, If human Conſciouſneſs be a

1ſt Def. p. 9.

Mode

Mode of ſome generical Power in Matter, it muſt not be the Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts.

To make this matter ſtill clearer, and anſwer all that I think can be alledg'd, I take the liberty to examine a Paſſage relating to the Argument that I am now upon, in the *Hiſtorical and Critical Dictionary* of that learned and acute Philoſopher Mr. *Bayle*, a zealous Aſſerter of the Immateriality of the Soul, who deny'd Thinking could be a Mode of Matter: * *Becauſe*, ſays he, *all Modes of which we have any knowledg, are of ſuch a nature that they never periſh, but to make room for another Mode of the ſame kind. There is no Figure that is deſtroy'd but by another Figure, and no Colour but what makes room for another Colour. Therefore if we would reaſon from what we obſerve in Matter, we ought to ſay, that no Thought ceaſes in Matter, but to make room for ſome other Thought by which it is ſucceeded, divide and confound this Matter how you will.* I am very far from denying what is ſelf-evident, that no Mode ever ceaſes but to give place to another Mode: and tho it ſhould be always to a Mode of the ſame generical kind, as one Colour or Figure is conſtantly ſucceeded by another, ſince all Matter muſt neceſſarily exiſt under ſome Figure, and appear under ſome Colour to the Eyes of Animals; yet it is no good conſequence, that every Mode muſt unavoidably be ſucceeded by a Mode of the ſame

* Car toutes les modalitez dont on a quelque connoiſſance ſont d'une telle nature, qu'elles ne ceſſent que pour faire place a une autre modalité de meme genre. Il n'y point de figure qui ſoit detruite que par une autre Figure, ni point de couleur qui ſoit chaſſé que par une autre couleur. Ainſi pour bien raiſonner l'on doit dire qu'il n'y a point de ſentiment qui ſoit chaſſé de ſa Subſtance que par l'Introduction de quelque autre Sentiment. *P.* 1044.

numerical Species, as that Round or Blue muſt ſtill be ſucceeded by Round or Blue; which would entirely deſtroy all Change or Succeſſion of Modes whatever, and ſo deprive the Univerſe of all Motion or Diverſity. Now if Thought be ſuppos'd a Species of Motion, then it never ceaſes indeed, but to make room for ſome other Motion (the Particles of all Bodies being in perpetual Action, as well as under ſome Figure or Colour) but it follows not that the ſucceeding Motion muſt always be a Thought for the Reaſons and Examples already alledg'd, no more than that the Motion of a going Clock exiſted in the ſeveral parts of it before, or continues after they are ſeparated. Now that human Conſciouſneſs or Thinking is a Mode of ſome generical Power in Matter, will, in my opinion, ſeem evident to every Man that conſults his own Experience, and ſuffers it not to be contradicted or confounded by unintelligible Diſtinctions or Sophiſtry. Thinking or Human Conſciouſneſs begins, continues and ends, or has Generation, Succeſſion and Corruption, like all other Modes of Matter; as like them it is divided and determin'd, ſimple or compounded, and ſo on. But if the Soul or Principle of Thinking be undivided, how can it think ſucceſſively, divide, abſtract, combine or ampliate, retain or revive Impreſſions in the Memory? And how can it be capable, partly or wholly, to forget any thing? All which *Phænomena* are naturally conceiv'd, and may be commodiouſly explain'd by the Springs and Movements, and Receptacles; by the vigour, perfection, diſorder or decay of a bodily Organ, but not by any thing indiviſible.

Does not Experience further convince us, that our ordinary Habits, no leſs than all our Actions, are corporeal; thoſe of contemplating and meditating, as well as thoſe of ſinging and dancing?

cing? Are we not frequently as much tir'd by the one, as by the other? Which could never be, if Contemplation and Meditation were Immaterial. The Reaction of our Thoughts and Words on one another does manifeſtly prove the Corporeity of both; the Word being no ſooner ſpoken than the Idea is excited, and the reviv'd Idea bringing its Name immediately into our remembrance: if we forget the one or the other, it betokens ſome defect in the Organ, as it is viſible in Children and old People; the Fibres of whoſe Nerves, and the Conſiſtence of whoſe Brains are ordinarily too moiſt and remiſs in the one, as they are too dry and rigid in the other. Nor does want of Memory or ſlowneſs of Conception appear in Perſons of a middle Age, but from ſome aſſignable Cauſe that diſcompoſes the Organ. Human Thinking being therefore a Mode of Matter, all parts of Matter may be ſuppos'd capable of producing it, not neceſſarily indeed, and at all times, no more than any other Modes, but only under a convenient Structure and Diſpoſition.

Upon the Principles I have now more fully explain'd, I think I might leave it to the intelligent Reader, or to Mr. *Clark* himſelf, to ſolve the remaining Difficulties that he urges: but to ſhow my Willingneſs to give Satisfaction to thoſe who are of opinion I ſhould not otherwiſe pay reſpect enough to a Man of his Ability, I proceed to conſider whatever I conceive affects the bottom of the Cauſe between us.

I had ſaid, 'That to ſuppoſe a Power ariſing *Reply* 14.
'from Matter, without belonging to the parts
'of which the whole conſiſts, is not to ſuppoſe
'an Univerſal to exiſt, but a particular Power
'exiſting, to which ſeveral particular Powers
'contribute; as every Man is a particular Man,

'tho various Powers are neceſſary to conſtitute 'him of that Species.'

2d Def. p. 9. To this Mr. *Clark* anſwers, *That if that Whole or Reſult, which I call a particular Power, be entirely and ſpecifically different from all and every one of the particular Powers contributing to it, as Thinking is from all the Particles not endued with Thought; I ſhall find if I conſider it carefully, that 'tis as certain as any Arithmetical Demonſtration, that ſuch a particular Power is a whole bigger than all its parts.* To ſhow the want of force in this Anſwer, let us apply it to Roundneſs; for if it concludes againſt Thinking's ariſing out of Particles not ſingly endu'd with thinking, it will equally conclude againſt the poſſibility of the exiſtence of Roundneſs in Body, which no more conſiſts of ſeveral Roundneſſes, (ſince in a round Body of an Inch diameter, 'tis as impoſſible that any one Particle of the Surface ſhould be round, as it is needleſs that any other ſhou'd be ſo; and therefore probable in many caſes, that not one Particle of a round Body is round in particular) no more, I ſay, than Thinking or Conſciouſneſs does of ſeveral Conſciouſneſſes, and is as ſpecifically different from other Figures, as Conſciouſneſs is from a circular Motion. *If the Whole or Reſult, which I call a particular Power, be ſpecifically different from all and every one of the particular Powers contributing to it, as* Roundneſs *is from all the Particles not endu'd with* Roundneſs, I *ſhall find if* I *conſider it carefully, that 'tis as certain as any Arithmetical Demonſtration, that ſuch a particular Power is a whole bigger than all its parts.* But in behalf of Roundneſs as well as Thinking, I anſwer, that 'tis ſo far from being as certain as an Arithmetical Demonſtration, that ſuch a particular Power is a whole bigger than all its parts, that 'tis an Arithmetical Demonſtration that ſuch a particular Power as Roundneſs is, is but juſt equal to all the

parts

parts of which that Roundneſs conſiſts: For what more goes to the compoſition of Roundneſs, than the conjunction of ſeveral Particles not ſingly endu'd with Roundneſs? And agreeably to the Suppoſition I lately made, what more goes to the Power of Thinking, than the conjunction of ſeveral Particles, not each endu'd with that Species of Motion call'd Thinking?

2. But to proceed a ſtep further, ſuppoſing we could not account for the beginning of Conſciouſneſs or Roundneſs from the various Compoſition of Matter, yet I cannot ſee what reaſon there is to exclude even created Beings from ſuperadding Powers to Matter, that are not always exiſting in Matter. If Matter is not eſſentially active, as I preſume Mr. *Clark* contends it is not, I would ask, upon the Suppoſition of ſome parts of it being at abſolute reſt, whether finite material Beings in motion were not ſufficient of themſelves to put them into motion, tho they had no motion before? Was not Matter's Capacity of Motion ſufficient to make it move, as ſoon as it was impell'd by another Being? In like manner, a Capacity to think may be ſufficient to cauſe us to think, tho we are ſometime without thinking; as a Capacity to think of a Triangle is ground enough to make us think upon it whenever that Figure is plac'd before our Eyes, tho we never have as yet thought upon it at all. And this I take to be the caſe of Operations of all kinds in finite Beings, *viz.* That it is ſo far from being a Repugnancy, to ſuppoſe them to have a beginning of their Exiſtence, that if we don't ſuppoſe a beginning of Operations, we muſt deſtroy all Change or Succeſſion whatever, and ſo entirely deprive the Univerſe of all Diverſity.

It is urg'd by Mr. *Clark*, *That to annex Conſciouſneſs to ſo flux a Subſtance as the Brain, or the Spirits in it, is a very great Abſurdity: for if the parts* 2d Def. P. 15.

of

of the Brain or Spirits be (as they certainly are) in perpetual flux and change; it will follow, that Conſciouſneſs, by which I not only remember that certain things were done many years ſince, but alſo am conſcious that they were done by the very ſame individual conſcious Being who now remembers them; it will follow, he ſays, *that Conſciouſneſs is transfer'd from one Subject to another; that is to ſay, that it is a real Quality which ſubſiſts without inhering in any Subject at all.* In the examination of this Argument I think ſomething will appear quite contrary to what Mr. *Clark* imagines, That it is ſo far from being abſurd to annex human Conſciouſneſs to ſo flux a Subſtance as the Brain, that it will rather be abſurd to annex it to any other Subſtance but ſo flux a one as the Brain: For if we utterly forget, or ceaſe to be conſcious of having done many things in the former parts of our Lives which which we certainly did, as much as any of thoſe things which we are conſcious that we have done; and if in fact we do by degrees forget every thing which we do not revive by frequent recollection, and by again and again imprinting our decaying Ideas; and if there be in a determinate time a partial or total flux of Particles in our Brains: What can better account for our total forgetfulneſs of ſome things, our partial forgetfulneſs of others, than to ſuppoſe the Subſtance of the Brain in a conſtant flux? And what can better ſhow that Conſciouſneſs is not transfer'd from one Subject to another, than our forgetting totally or partially, according to the Brain's being more or leſs in a flux? But I will ſuppoſe that I am conſcious to have done ſome things, without having one Particle of the Brain the ſame that I had when I did thoſe things; how then can I be conſcious that I did them, without allowing Conſciouſneſs to be transfer'd from one Subject to another? This I think contains the ſtrength of Mr.

Clark's

Clark's Objection. In anſwer to which, I will ſuppoſe my ſelf conſcious at Forty of having been carry'd to a Market or Fair at five years old, without any Particle of Matter about me, the ſame which I had at that Age: Now in order to retain the Conſciouſneſs of that Action, it is neceſſary to revive the Idea of it before any conſiderable flux of Particles, (otherwiſe I muſt totally loſe the memory of it, as I do of ſeveral things done in my Childhood) and by reviving the Idea of that Action, I imprint afreſh the Conſciouſneſs of having done that Action, by which the Brain has as lively an Impreſſion of Conſciouſneſs (tho it be not intirely compos'd of the ſame Particles) as it had the day after it did the Action, or as it has of a Triangle, or any other new Idea not before imprinted on it. Conſciouſneſs of having done that Action is an Idea imprinted on the Brain, by recollecting or bringing into view our Ideas before they are quite worn out; which Idea continues in me, not only the memory of the Action it ſelf, but that I did it. And if there is every now and then a recollection of a paſt Action, Mr. *Clark* may, by what I have ſaid, conceive a Man may be conſcious of things done by him, tho he has not one Particle of Matter the ſame that he had at the doing of thoſe things, without *Conſciouſneſs's being transfer'd from one Subject to another* in any abſurd Senſe of thoſe words.

I did incidentally, in my *Reply* to Mr. *Clark*'s firſt *Defence*, whither I refer the Reader for the occaſion, make this Suppoſition, 'As what ſeem'd 'matter of fact to me: That the Matter of 'which an Egg conſiſts, doth entirely conſtitute 'the young one; and that the Action of Senſa- 'tion began under a particular diſpoſition of the 'parts by Motion, without the addition of an 'immaterial and immortal Soul': which Mr. *Clark* ſays *is in every part contrary to all the Diſco-* *Reply* 22. *2d Def.* 22, 23.

veries

veries in Anatomy, and to all true Philoſophy; for ſo far is it from being true, that the Matter of the Egg, by any particular diſpoſition of its parts by motion, is form'd into or conſtitutes the young One, that it does not conſtitute it at all, not ſo much as the Body of it, but only ſerves it for Nouriſhment and Growth: it being as impoſſible that the unorganiz'd Body of a Chicken ſhould, by the Power of any mechanical Motions, be form'd out of the unorganiz'd Matter of an Egg; as that the Sun, Moon and Stars ſhou'd, by mere Mechaniſm, riſe out of a Chaos.

In anſwer to which I aver, that my Suppoſition is ſo far from being contrary to all the Diſcoveries in Anatomy, and to all true Philoſophy, that if Mr. *Clark* has given a juſt Account of all thoſe Diſcoveries in Anatomy and Philoſophy in this Paragraph, it is agreeable to them all, except his ſaying, *That the organiz'd Body of the Animal is no part of the Matter of the Egg.* And as for that Diſcovery *made in Anatomy by Microſcopical Obſervations*, I take it to be *not only remov'd backwards from the Search and common Notions even of the moſt inquiſitive Men*, but contrary to ſuch undoubted matter of fact, that I will venture to inſiſt on it in oppſition to all the Diſcoveries in Anatomy Mr. *Clark* is acquainted with; for if by our Eyes we can perceive the organiz'd Body of the Animal to be part of the Matter of the Egg, no Microſcopical Obſervation can deſtroy ſuch matter of fact. Microſcopical Obſervations may help us to diſcover the Exiſtence of ſome things, the Beauty and Contrivance of others, which by our mere Organs we are unable to do; but can never make us ſee nothing where we do ſee ſomething.

I no where deny the organiz'd Body of the Animal to have been form'd long before it is comprehended in the Shell: All that I affirm is, that when the organiz'd Body is comprehended within

within the Shell, it then becomes part of the Matter of the Egg; and I continue to ſuppoſe that Senſation doth not begin in the Animal till ſome of the other parts of the Egg become parts of the Animal by motion, or *by ſerving it for Nouriſhment and Growth*; tho I muſt at the ſame time confeſs, that I ſee no Abſurdity in ſuppoſing the organiz'd Body of the Animal to be form'd by Mechanical Motions out of ſuch Matter as the unorganiz'd parts of an Egg, if they may be call'd *unorganiz'd:* Thoſe Parts are not indeed Legs, Wings, Eyes, *&c.* and ſo are not organiz'd in that ſenſe; but yet they are ſo diſpos'd or organiz'd as to contribute by their motion towards ſomething orderly and regular, and to become parts of the Leg or the Eye of an Animal. I conceive, no Matter, in the preſent State of the Univerſe, can be compar'd to a Chaos; from whence I grant no regular Work can be produc'd by mere Mechaniſm, but all is diſpos'd by the Power of God in a ſtate of Regularity: and as there was no contradiction for the organiz'd Body of the Animal to be firſt form'd by Matter regularly mov'd, nor no contradiction for other parts of Matter to be join'd to that Body by a regular Motion; ſo it is no more a contradiction to ſuppoſe ſuch an union of Parts to begin in an Egg, whereby the Body of an Animal may be form'd, than it was for ſuch an union of Parts to begin a thouſand years before, or than it is that thoſe Parts ſhou'd grow in the manner they do by the addition of other Particles to them. Mr. *Clark* adds, *And that Senſation ſhou'd begin under a particular Diſpoſition of the Parts, is ſtill more impoſſible; becauſe it is ſuppoſing ſomething to come out of that in which it never was.* Senſation is by me ſuppos'd to be in the Parts of the Animal, as Roundneſs is in the Parts which compoſe a round Body; each Part has as much of Senſation, ſin-

gly consider'd, as each part of a round Body has of Roundness: and when the Parts are duly dispos'd, whole Thinking is perform'd, as whole Roundness exists by the conjunction of Parts.

2. But supposing Sensation did not exist in the parts antecedent to their union, as Motion does not in those parts of Matter that are at absolute rest; why may not the one have actual Sensation by virtue of an antecedent Capacity to have Sensation, without having always actual Sensation, as well as Matter at absolute rest may have actual motion by virtue of an antecedent Capacity to have motion, without being always in actual motion?

Rep'y, p. 16. I did indeed think it absurd *to recur to the addition of an immaterial and immortal Soul*, to solve the Phenomenon of Sensation in Animals; because I cannot conceive it possible for all the numerous sensible Creatures which Microscopical Observations do discover to us to exist in all parts of the Universe, even in our own Bodies, and the Liquors that we drink, to be proper Subjects of eternal Rewards and Punishments. Mr. *Clark* goes on: *Let it be so*, (that is, let it be absurd to have recourse to the addition of an immaterial and immortal Soul to account for Sensation in Animals) he *can as easily suppose, if* I *must needs have an Hypothesis, that the immaterial* and immortal Soul *was not added afterwards, but was in it from the time that the seminal Principle it self of the organiz'd Body was fram'd.* I am against all mere Hypotheses, and was, particularly in that place Mr. *Clark* refers to, contending against an Opinion that I take to be a mere Hypothesis: and tho I did not expressly mention that Hypothesis which Mr. *Clark* is pleas'd to suppose for me, yet I conceive that that Hypothesis is as much excluded by my supposing that an Animal consists only of mere Matter, as if I had directly mention'd it;

2d Def. p. 23.

and

and therefore I wonder that Mr. *Clark* cou'd imagine that one of thoſe Hypotheſes ſhou'd content me any more than the other, or that I have any fondneſs at all for any Hypotheſes. I ſatisfy my ſelf with obſerving matter of fact, and believe what I ſee, till ſubſequent matter of fact convinces me of the firſt falſe Appearances of things, and then I correct my firſt Opinion from the ſecond Appearance. Micrography and Aſtronomy do help us to ſettle ſeveral important Facts, which without their aſſiſtance we ſhould be apt to miſtake; but as for any Suppoſitions, to account for any matters of Fact or Effects that we obſerve, I deny them all, unleſs it involves a Contradiction not to make ſuch Suppoſitions; and I will allow Mr. *Clark* to aſſign one or twenty unknown Beings in every Animal, when it is a Contradiction not to ſuppoſe one or twenty: but till that time I think it not proper to go beyond my Eye-ſight, nor, as I ſee nothing but Matter in Animals, to believe there is any thing but Matter in them.

One thing more under this Head I think my ſelf oblig'd to take notice of: Mr. *Clark* had ſaid, *That Gravitation is the effect of the continu'd and regular Operation of ſome other Being on Matter.* 1ſt Def. p. 13. Upon which I ſaid, 'That it does not appear but Reply, p. 24. 'that Matter gravitates by virtue of Powers ori- 'ginally plac'd in it by God, and is now left to 'it ſelf to act by thoſe original Powers. And it 'is as conceivable that Matter ſhou'd act by vir- 'tue of thoſe Powers, as that an immaterial Be- 'ing ſhou'd put it into motion, or continue it in 'motion.' This *Opinion of mine Mr.* Clark *thinks is a great Miſtake in my Philoſophy; for when a Stone that was at reſt, does of it ſelf, upon its Support being remov'd, begin to fall downwards, what is it that cauſes the Stone to begin to move? Is it poſſible to be an Effect without a Cauſe? Is it impoſſible* 2d Def. p. 30, 31.

without an Impeller? Or can a Law or a Power, that is to ſay, a mere abſtract Name, or a complex Notion, and not any real Being, impel a Stone, and cauſe it to begin to move?

1. The Queſtion is not, whether *any real Being* moves a Stone that was at reſt, when it begins to fall downwards, upon its Support being remov'd; but whether *another Being*, or a Being diſtinct from Matter, does continually impel it, either immediately or mediately, (for I deny not the neceſſity of a Being impelling another, in order to cauſe that Mode of Motion call'd *Gravitation*) and therefore Mr. *Clark* changes the Queſtion, when he introduces ſome *real Being* as neceſſary to impel a Stone, or cauſe it to begin to move upon its Support being remov'd, inſtead of what he firſt affirm'd, *That Gravitation is the Effect of the continu'd and regular Operation of ſome other Being on Matter:* and conſequently his Queſtions, *What is it cauſes the Stone to move? Is it poſſible to be an Effect without a Cauſe? Is it impell'd without an Impeller? Or can a Law or Power, that is to ſay, an abſtract Name, or complex Notion, and not any real Being, impel a Stone, or cauſe it to move?* reach not the Queſtion of the neceſſity of the regular and continu'd Operation of an immaterial Being on Matter, in order to cauſe that Mode of Motion call'd *Gravitation.*

1ſt Def. p. 13.

2. As I did not exclude the impulſe of other Bodies contiguous to the Body gravitating, but only the continu'd and regular Operation of an immaterial Being on it, from being a conſtant cauſe of Gravitation; ſo I do not think the mere impulſe of the ſurrounding Bodies to be the ſole cauſe of that Motion: And to ſpeak my own Opinion, it ſeems matter of fact to me, that the external Figure and internal Configuration of the parts of Matter, are thoſe Powers in Matter by which it receives that peculiar Mode of Motion call'd

call'd Gravitation, from the circumambient impelling Bodies. For drop a Pound of Lead, in the form of a Bullet, from the top of a Tower, and it deſcends in a very quick ſpace to the Ground: Vary the external Figure of the Bullet, by beating it out broad with a Hammer, and its tendency downwards decreaſes; vary the configuration of its parts by Fire, and it will aſcend inſtead of deſcending; the ſame Action of the circumambient Bodies producing theſe three different Effects by this three-fold diſpoſition of the ſelf-ſame quantity of Lead: So that Matter's Determination ſeems purely owing to the Cauſes and Powers I have aſſign'd. And I have often admir'd that Gravitation ſhould be eſteem'd a matter of ſuch difficulty among Philoſophers; for when once Motion is ſuppos'd, and that all Matter is in conſtant motion and perpetually ſtriking one part againſt another, as I think no body doubts, one part of Matter muſt be determin'd one way, and another part another way; and Gravitation being one mode of motion, *viz.* a tendency towards a Centre, (whether it be of the whole Vortex, or only of our Earth, or the particular Center of that peculiar motion which depends upon the Sphere of its Activity) ſome parts of Matter muſt as neceſſarily gravitate, as others have different motions. Nay, properly ſpeaking, there is no Motion whatever but is Gravitation reſpectively; for whatever aſcends with reſpect to us, deſcends with reſpect to other Bodies; and whatever deſcends with reſpect to us, aſcends with reſpect to others: ſo that if there is any Motion in the Univerſe, there muſt be Gravitation.

3. When therefore I ſaid, 'It does not appear 'but that Matter gravitates by virtue of Powers 'originally plac'd in it by God, and that it is as 'conceivable that Matter ſhould act by virtue of 'thoſe *Reply*, *p.* 74.

'thoſe Powers, as that an immaterial Being 'ſhould put Matter into motion, or continue it 'in motion;' I did not lay it down as my Opinion, that Matter did act without a direct impulſe from Matter, but ſuppos'd it as intelligible, that Matter might act without Impulſe by Powers plac'd in it by God, as that an immaterial Being ſhou'd move Matter without being able to impel it by Contact. And whenever Mr. *Clark* gives me an Idea how an immaterial Being can move Matter, or in what place God can be conceiv'd beginning a motion of Gravity or Levity in the Univerſe, when in the Univerſe there is no up or down in reality, (for to ſay that God acts reſpectively, ſhows but the Pertinency of my Queſtion the more, ſince he muſt then be neceſſarily plac'd with reſpect to an aſſignable Center) then I promiſe to give him an Idea how Matter ſhould move by Powers plac'd in it by God, without the impulſe of other Bodies, or even *by* what *Mr. Clark* calls *an abſtract Name*, or a *complex Notion.*

4. But was it my Opinion that Matter did act by virtue of Powers plac'd in it by God, without the impulſe of matter, I think I have *Mr. Clark* of my opinion, when he ſays, *All Matter conſiſts of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts:* for if it is actually divided *in infinitum*, it can never act by Impulſe, but muſt act by other Powers; unleſs Mr. *Clark* will ſay, that 'tis an immaterial Being, that conſtantly and immediately moves every Particle of matter. But whether I take Mr. *Clark* right or no, the incomparable Sir *Iſaac Newton* is of opinion, * That *ſeveral Phenomena of Nature may depend on certain Forces, whereby from Cauſes*

Letter to Mr. D. p. 33.

* Suſpicer ea omnia (viz. Phænomena Naturæ) ex viribus pendere poſſe, quibus Corporum particulæ per cauſas nondum

ſes (or Powers) yet undiſcover'd, the Particles of Bodies are mutually impell'd againſt each other, and cohere according to regular Figures, or whereby they recede or are driven from one another; which Forces or Powers *being yet unknown, the Philoſophers hitherto have attempted Nature in vain.*

Sect. 2. Beſides anſwering directly to Mr. *Clark*'s pretended Demonſtration, I did endeavour to ſhow, that if it prov'd the Impoſſibility of Matter's thinking, it wou'd equally prove the Impoſſibility of an immaterial Being's thinking, ſince Mr. *Clark* did not exclude Extenſion out of his Idea of immaterial Being. For his Argument being founded on the Proof of this Propoſition, that Diviſibility and Thinking cannot cohere or exiſt together in the ſame Subject; and Mr. *Clark* allowing, *That there are Particles of Matter which are to any Powers in Nature indiſcerpible*; I obſerv'd, 'That if there may be Matter which 'implys Indiviſibility by natural Cauſes, no Ar- 'gument can be brought to prove the Indiviſibi- 'lity of ſuch Particles of Matter, but what will 'equally prove the Diviſibility of any finite ex- 'tended Being': and conſequently, either all Matter is not diviſible, and ſo, by Mr. *Clark*'s Principles, is not excluded from a poſſibility of Thinking; or elſe an immaterial Being is no more capable of thinking than a material one.

1ſt Def. p. 22. *Reply*, p. 37.

But Mr. *Clark* anſwers, *That ſuch a Difficulty is wide of the main Queſtion; for if the foregoing Proof, That Matter is incapable of thinking cannot be ſhown to be defective, it neceſſarily follows, that the Soul muſt be an indiſcerpible Subſtance*, tho extended.

2d Def. p. 37.

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nondum cognitas vel in ſe mutuo impelluntur, & ſecundum figuras regulares cohærent, vel ab invicem fugantur & recedunt: quibus viribus ignotis Philoſophi hactenus naturam fruſtra tentarunt. *Newtoni Præfatio ad Philoſophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica.*

1. Tho Mr. *Clark*'s Argument cou'd not be ſhown to be defective, it does not follow that an extended Being muſt be indiſcerpible; for if I have as clear Evidence of the Diviſibility of an immaterial Being by the Power of God, as of a material one, (as I contend we have, and have ſhown in my *Reply*, whither I refer the Reader) and if I have likewiſe clear Evidence that a diviſible Being cannot think, as I am likewiſe ſuppos'd to have, what remains for us but Darkneſs and Confuſion, and Scepticiſm, under ſuch a ballance of Evidence? A View of Mr. *Clark*'s way of arguing againſt the poſſibility of Matter's thinking, urg'd againſt the poſſibility of an immaterial Being's thinking, will make it evident to the Reader, that there is no more ground from that Argument to conclude againſt Matter's thinking, than againſt an immaterial Being's thinking. And therefore as Mr. *Clark* endeavours to ſhow that Matter cannot think, becauſe by the Power of God it is diviſible; ſo I who ſee no manner of difference between any other finite extended Being and Matter in that reſpect, urge Mr. *Clark*'s Argument, to prove that an immaterial Being cannot think, thus: Whatever is diviſible by the Power of God, cannot, according to him, have a Power of thinking: An immaterial Being is extended, and conſequently muſt be diviſible by the Power of God, (if it be true that all Matter is diviſible, becauſe no Argument can be brought to prove all Matter diviſible that will not prove all finite extended Beings diviſible) therefore an immaterial Being cannot think. And if it be prov'd that an immaterial Being cannot think, then it follows, that the Being which thinks in us muſt be material. If it is further objected, to weaken the force of the foregoing Proof, That all material Subſtance is likewiſe diviſible, Mr. *Clark*'s Anſwer

P. 37, 38, 39.

ſwer in behalf of immaterial Subſtance will ſerve the caſe of material Subſtance; and it may be ſaid, *That this Difficulty is wide of the main Queſtion; for if the foregoing Proof, that immaterial Being is incapable of thinking, cannot be ſhown to be defective, it follows neceſſarily, that the Soul muſt be an indiſcerpible material Subſtance.*

2. But Mr. *Clark* ſays, *There are many Demonſtrations, even in abſtract Mathematicks themſelves, which no Man who underſtands them can in the leaſt doubt of the certainty of, which yet are attended with difficult conſequences, that cannot be perfectly clear'd. The infinite Diviſibility of Matter is an Inſtance of this kind; alſo the Eternity of God and his Immenſity are attended with the like Difficulties.* In anſwer to this, I ſay, That if there are any ſuch Demonſtrations, from whence any Contradictions or Abſurdities follow in our way of conceiving things, thoſe Abſurdities and Contradictions ſhould affect a Demonſtration ſo far that I ought to ſuſpend my Aſſent. In our Aſſent or Diſſent to Propoſitions, we have no other ground of either, than the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas, for which the Terms in Propoſitions ſtand. And if things make ſuch an appearance to our Underſtandings, that we do *a priori* perceive, or imagine we perceive demonſtrative Proof of the Truth of a Propoſition, and perceive or imagine that we perceive Abſurdities and Contradictions follow from that Propoſition which we imagin'd we perceiv'd to be demonſtrative; what have we but two repugnant Demonſtrations, which ought to leave the Mind in ballance or ſuſpence? For on which ſide can I ſuſpect that my Underſtanding fails me? There is no more reaſon to ſuſpect that my Underſtanding fails me, when I think that I perceive an Abſurdity, Contradiction, or Diſagree-

2d Def. p. 38.

ment of Ideas, than when I think I perceive the Agreement of Ideas.

3 But I deny that there are any Inſtances of this kind in Nature, and particularly that the *Infinite Diviſibility of Matter*, *the Eternity and Immenſity of God*, are ſuch Inſtances. And I deſire Mr. *Clark* to define thoſe foregoing Terms, and tell me, what they ſtand for in his Mind: and if his meaning of thoſe Terms agree to the reality of things, inſtead of making real Beings of abſtract Notions, I require him to prove that any Abſurdity or Contradiction follows either from the *infinite Diviſibility of Matter*, *the Eternity* or *Immenſity of God*, in our way of conceiving; and if he cannot, he has no ground from thoſe Inſtances to put human Nature in ſuch a ſtate of Scepticiſm and Abſurdity.

2d Def. 30. 4. As to his urging again his Inſtance of Space, which I readily own to be indiſcerpible, to ſhow the poſſibility of immaterial Subſtance's being indiſcerpible, tho extended, I tell him again, that Space (which Mr. *Clark* ſays is only *an abſtract Idea of Immenſity*) will by no means reach his purpoſe: for Space is infinite, and not only infinite, but being incapable of being conſider'd, either as *acting or being acted on*, is no Being or Subſtance at all, and therefore its Indiviſibility can't prove the poſſibility of a finite extended Subſtance's being indiviſible, but the contrary: for Space is only indiviſible by having thoſe two before-mention'd Qualities that make it differ from the immaterial Being in queſtion.

Lectures, vol. 1. p. 63.

5. To ſhew the difference between an immaterial and material Subſtance as to their Diviſibility, Mr. *Clark* ſays, *The Suppoſition of an immaterial Subſtance's being by the Power of God divided into Parts, (which concerning Matter is allow'd to be poſſible) may be deny'd to be poſſible, as being a Suppoſition*

2d Def. 40.

poſition which deſtroys the Eſſence of the Subſtance it ſelf.

What ſignifys the confeſſion of ſome or all Men, that all Matter is diviſible, or Mr. *Clark*'s denial that immaterial Subſtance is diviſible, to ſhow a difference between an immaterial and material Subſtance as to Diviſibility? Material Subſtance is not upon that account prov'd diviſible, nor immaterial Subſtance indiviſible. The Diviſibility or Indiviſibility of either Subſtance depends not upon ſuch confeſſion or denial; if it did, I might retort his Argument upon him thus: That immaterial Subſtance is by me confeſs'd to be diviſible, but may concerning material Thinking Subſtance be denied to be poſſible, *as being a Suppoſition which deſtroys the Subſtance it ſelf*; for I have juſt as much reaſon to make that Suppoſition concerning a material Being, *that cannot by natural Cauſes be made ſmaller*, as he has concerning an immaterial Being; that is, both Suppoſitions are equally precarious.

But he had no reaſon at all to ſay, That all Matter was confeſs'd to be diviſible; becauſe I was ſo far from making any ſuch general *Confeſſion*, that I did in my *Reply* deny all Matter could be prov'd diviſible by any Argument that would not equally conclude for the Diviſibility of an immaterial Being; and conſequently, if thoſe Arguments were not ſufficient to prove the Diviſibility of immaterial Subſtance, neither would they, according to me, prove the Diviſibility of all material Subſtance. And therefore I ſhall be ſo far from allowing all Matter to be diviſible, that whenever Mr. *Clark* proves to me the neceſſary Indiviſibility of any finite extended Subſtance, I will then deny that all Matter can be prov'd to be diviſible.

Sect. 3. I offer'd two Arguments to ſhow that the Suppoſition of the Immateriality of the Soul, was of no uſe to the Ends and Purpoſes of Religion, were it capable of Demonſtration: for I ſaid, 'Unleſs a thinking immaterial Subſtance 'can be prov'd naturally immortal, the Soul 'cannot be prov'd naturally immortal; and I 'ask'd, Of what uſe then is this Argument to 'the Ends and Purpoſes of Religion? For if we 'have no ſecurity that we muſt exiſt hereafter 'in a ſtate of Perception, as by only proving 'the natural Immortality of the Subſtance of the 'Soul, we have not; it can be of no uſe to in-'fluence our Lives and Actions.' From which Paſſages it is plain, that the Queſtion of this Article was, whether an immaterial Being, or the Subſtance of the Soul could be prov'd to be in a perpetual ſtate of thinking; or elſe ſuppoſing that tho it could not by this Argument be prov'd to be always in a ſtate of Perception, whether it was ſtill of uſe to the Ends and Purpoſes of Religion.

Letter to Mr. D. p. 13.

To prove the poſſibility of Thinking as an Action's ceaſing in an immaterial Being, I did in my *Reply* obſerve, 'That the Soul has not only 'different Paſſions at different times, ſuch as 'Anger, Love, &c. which are Modifications that 'begin and have their period, but has Qualities 'and Powers, ſuch as ſeeing and hearing, (which 'by the defect of our Organs plainly ceaſe for a 'time.) I likewiſe inſtanc'd in the motion of the 'Soul from one place to another, which might 'be entirely owing to external and material 'Cauſes.'

P. 30.

P. 33.

And what Anſwer has Mr. *Clark* given to ſhow the uſefulneſs of his Argument to the ends and purpoſes of Religion, but by changing the terms of the Queſtion, and not only the terms themſelves, but the meaning of thoſe terms? For inſtead

inſtead of conſidering Thinking as an *Action*, he uſes the terms *Power of Thinking*, (by which I now find that he meant *Capacity of Thinking*,) and in his *Second Defence* changes the term *Motion* into *Mobility*, and the Powers of ſeeing and hearing urg'd on him to prove the poſſibility of Thinking's ceaſing in an immaterial Being, into a Capacity of hearing and ſeeing; whereby my Argument is turn'd to quite another purpoſe than it was intended by me, and the Reader is diverted from the true State of the Queſtion; and Mr. *Clark* himſelf, inconſiſtently with his Cenſure of me for *nice Diſtinguiſhing*, does diſtinguiſh between actual Thinking and a capacity of Thinking, actual Motion and a capacity of Motion, *&c.* But yet I ſhould not have cenſur'd him for this, had he not really *perplex'd* the Reader with a new Queſtion, as I aver this Queſtion, *Whether the Soul muſt for ever be capable of Thinking*, to be, and to have no relation to the Queſtion in diſpute: For allowing the Soul can never exiſt without a capacity to think; of what uſe is a proof that the Soul muſt always have that *capacity*, in order to influence Mens Actions, when notwithſtanding that the Soul may no more exiſt in a ſtate of Perception, or Rewards and Puniſhments, than a Man born blind ſees Colours, or a deaf Man hears Sounds?

1ſt Def. 21.

P. 34.

What follows being founded on this change of the Queſtion, needs no other anſwer than what I have already given.

Sect. 4. My laſt Objection was, 'That if from 'the Power of thinking we can prove the Im- 'mortality of the Soul of Man, and from its 'Immateriality prove its natural Immortality, 'and conſequently its capacity of eternal Hap- 'pineſs, the power of Thinking muſt prove the 'Immateriality of the Souls of Brutes, the Im- 'materiality

Reply 45.

'materiality of their Souls muſt prove their na-
'tural Immortality, and conſequently their ca-
'pacity of eternal Happineſs.'

2d Def. 41. To which Mr. *Clark* anſwers, *Cannot God, if he pleaſes, cauſe them to periſh at the diſſolution of their Bodies, or elſe annihilate them at any other time?* Now by all the Rules of anſwering, Mr. *Clark* ought to have taken notice of the Reply I made in the cloſe of the Objection it ſelf to the Anſwer he here gives me, and ought either to have confeſs'd its Force, or elſe ſhow'd the Inconcluſiveneſs thereof; but ſince he has thought fit to do otherwiſe, I take the liberty to repeat that part of my Objection again, that I eſteem perfectly ſatisfactory to his Anſwer, and which is as follows: 'That if it be ſuppos'd 'that the Souls of Brutes may be ſometime or 'other annihilated, then Mr. *Clark*'s Argument 'is not uſeful to the end for which it was in-'tended, becauſe mere natural Immortality will 'then be no proof of the real Immortality of 'the Soul of Man.' But Mr. *Clark* has a ſecond Anſwer: *Cannot God*, ſays he, *diſpoſe of them into States ſutable to their particular Natures, which yet may in no propriety be ſtil'd a Capacity of eternal Happineſs, as that of Man is?* Mr. *Clark* lays the ſtreſs in a wrong place. I meant no more by ſuppoſing Brutes capable of eternal Happineſs as well as Man, but only a ſtate wherein they might enjoy conſtant agreeable Perceptions, as Mr. *Clark* may ſee if he conſiders the 44th Page of my *Reply*; and had no deſign to compare the ſeveral degrees of Happineſs among created Beings in the next World. But ſince Mr. *Clark* acknowledges all the numerous ſenſible Creatures to be Subjects of eternal Rewards, I ask him whether Mites, Flees, Lice, Oyſters, Rats and Mice, may be puniſh'd eternally, as well as enjoy eternal Rewards? If he anſwers, that

that they muſt only enjoy eternal Rewards, then he elevates Brutes above Men, and places them in a much more eligible Condition. If he anſwers, that they are Subjects both of eternal Rewards and Puniſhments; I ask, for what it is that eternal Rewards are beſtow'd on ſome Animals, and eternal Puniſhments beſtow'd on others? If they are to have eternal Rewards or Puniſhments, they muſt have them either according as they act agreeably or diſagreeably to ſome Rules of Action; and then they muſt be allow'd to be moral Agents, and conſequently to have all the Powers in them which Men have that are neceſſary to make their Actions eſteem'd *Moral*; or elſe they muſt be puniſh'd or rewarded, that thoſe who have receiv'd Injuries in this Life may be compenſated in the next, and thoſe who have been proſperous in the rapine and ſlaughter of their fellow Animals may be puniſh'd, whereby there may be a perfect Equality in God's dealing with them; agreeably to what Mr. *Arnaud* relates in *Reflexions ſur le Syſteme du P. Mallebranche: Quand on leur demandoit* (that is, ſome *Jews* that maintain'd Brutes were proper Subjects of eternal Rewards and Puniſhments) *quelle juſtice il y avoit dans la mort des bêtes, quelle peché elles avoient commis, & pourquoi Dieu vouloit, puis que ſa providence s'etendoit a tout, qu'un Rat Innocent fût dechiré par un Chat, Ils repondoient, Que Dieu l'avoit ainſi ordonné, mais qu'il recompenſeroit ce Rat dans le ſiecle a venir.* Liv. 1. p. 246.

From theſe and ſome other Conſequences flowing from the foregoing Argument, we have ſo ſtrange a view of the State of Man, that I conceive there can be no greater Service to Religion, than to ſhow the uſeleſneſs of that Argument to the ends and purpoſes of Religion; eſpecially ſince there are ſuch ſolid Arguments for a future

State

State from Topicks that can neither be anſwer'd by Infidels, nor loaded with any abſurd Conſequences.

Mr. *Clark*, in the concluſion of his *Defence*, has ſum'd up his Argument in fifteen Propoſitions, which I now propoſe to conſider, that my Anſwer to him may be compleat, tho all that he advances in them is overthrown in the foregoing Reflections.

His Propoſitions are:

1. *Every Syſtem of Matter conſiſts of a multitude of diſtinct Parts.*

This Propoſition, which he *thinks is granted by all*, is, I'm ſure, deny'd by a great many. However, I ſhall not at preſent enter into any debate with him concerning it, but continue to ſuppoſe it as I have hitherto done.

2. *Every real Quality inheres in ſome Subject.*

3. *No individual or ſingle Quality of one Particle of Matter can be the individual or ſingle Quality of another Particle of Matter.*

Theſe two I grant.

4. *Every real ſimple Quality that reſides in any whole material Syſtem, reſides in all the parts of that Syſtem.*

5. *Every real compound Quality that reſides in any whole material Syſtem, is a number of ſimple Qualities reſiding in all the parts of that Syſtem, ſome in one part, ſome in another.*

Theſe two Propoſitions I ſhall not contend with him about, tho he ſeems to me to confound *ſimple and compound Qualities* together; for in his Explication ſubjoin'd to his fourth Propoſition, as an Example of what he means by a *ſimple*

Quality,

Quality, he inſtances in the *Motion of a Body*; *which*, ſays he, *conſiſts in the ſum of the Motions of its ſeveral Parts.* And in his Explication ſubjoin'd to his fifth Propoſition, as an example of what he means by *compound Qualities*, he ſays, *The Simples blue and yellow make the compound Colour call'd Green.* Now the motion of a Clock is to me as much a *compound Quality* as the colour *Green* is a *compound Quality*; for the various Motions of a Clock, its circular, perpendicular, and other Motions, are as ſpecifically different from one another, as blue and yellow are from one another: and therefore I confeſs that I have no clear Ideas from Mr. *Clark*'s Explications to the terms *Simple and Compound.*

6. *Every real Quality, ſimple or compound, that reſults from any whole material Syſtem, but does not reſide in it, that is, neither in all its diſtinct Parts, nor in all the Parts of ſome portion of it, according to the Explication of the two foregoing Propoſitions, is the Mode of ſome other Subſtance, and not of that.*

This Propoſition I grant, on condition that inſtead of *other Subſtance* be ſubſtituted the words *other Subject*: for I grant Sweetneſs does not reſide in a Sugar-Loaf; that is, *neither in all the diſtinct Parts, nor in all the Parts of ſome portion of a Sugar-Loaf, but is produc'd in another* Subject (and not in another *Subſtance*) as all other Senſations or Modes of Thinking are; which Subject I contend is material.

7. *Every Power, ſimple or compound, that reſults from any whole material Syſtem, but does not reſide in it, that is in all its Parts, in the manner before explain'd, nor yet reſides in any other Subſtance as its Subject, is no real Quality at all; but muſt be either it ſelf a real Subſtance (which ſeems unintelli-*

gible) or elſe it is nothing elſe but merely an abſtract Name, as all Univerſals are.

8. *Conſciouſneſs is neither a mere abſtract Name, (ſuch as the Powers mention'd in* Prop. 7.) *nor a Power of exciting or occaſioning different Modes in a foreign Subſtance (ſuch as are the ſenſible Qualities of Bodies,* Prop. 6.) *but a real Quality, truly and properly inhering in the Subject it ſelf, the thinking Subſtance.*

Before I anſwer to this Propoſition, it is neceſſary to be very preciſe in unraveling what ſeems to be very much perplex'd in it. Mr. *Clark* confounds two things that ought to be ſeparated, *viz. The Power of exciting Modes in a foreign Subject*, and the Modes that are excited, when he ſays, *ſenſible Qualities in Bodies* are *Powers of exciting Modes in another Subject*; whereas Sweetneſs, Sounds, *&c.* which are vulgarly term'd *ſenſible Qualities in Bodies*, are only Ideas, Senſations, or Modes of thinking in us, and exiſt not at all in thoſe Bodies of which they are ſaid to be ſenſible Qualities: and therefore the Powers in Bodies muſt be ſomething very different from thoſe Qualities, as different as a Cauſe is from an Effect; and (that I may proceed with the greater clearneſs) I will ſuppoſe thoſe Powers to excite Modes in another Subject to be peculiar Modes of Motion in certain Syſtems of Matter.

Having thus diſtinguiſh'd, I ſhall anſwer to this Propoſition in each of the foregoing Senſes.

1. I do agree that Conſciouſneſs is neither a mere abſtract Name (ſuch as are the Powers mention'd in *Prop.* 7.) nor does it exiſt in the Brain, as Sweetneſs is vulgarly ſuppos'd to do in a Roſe, and as all ſenſible Qualities in Bodies are ſuppos'd to do; but is a real Quality, truly and pro-

properly inhering in the Subject it ſelf, the Brain, as Modes of Motion do in ſome Bodies, and Roundneſs does in others.

2. I do agree again that Conſciouſneſs is not a mere abſtract Name, but is a Power of the Brain anſwering to the Powers in Matter that produce Senſations in us. For as thoſe Powers or Modes of Motion are peculiar to certain Syſtems of Matter, and are not the Sums of Powers of the ſame numerical kind; ſo neither is Conſciouſneſs the Sum of Powers of the ſame numerical kind: And as thoſe Syſtems of Matter do by peculiar Modes of Motion produce Ideas in us; ſo we by the Power of thinking can enlarge or abſtract Ideas, that is, modify them, or cauſe changes in them, as well as external ſenſible things can cauſe Modes or Changes in us. And therefore Conſciouſneſs anſwers, or may be liken'd to thoſe Powers in ſome Syſtems of Matter that are occaſions of Modes in another Subject; and is at the ſame time a Quality as much inhering in Matter as the Motion of a Clock does in the parts of a Clock, or as Roundneſs, or any other particular or individual Figure in a Body.

9. *No real Quality can reſult from the compoſition of different Qualities, ſo as to be a new Quality in the ſame Subject, of a different kind or ſpecies from all and every one of the component Qualities.*

According to Mr. *Clark*'s Explication of this Propoſition, I allow this likewiſe to be true; for *from Motion nothing but Motion can ariſe, and from Figure nothing but Figure:* But this reaches not the caſe of Numerical Powers, and particularly reaches not the caſe of Conſciouſneſs. A real Numerical Power, as I ſuppoſe Conſciouſneſs to be, and ſuch as Roundneſs is, may reſult from the compoſition of different Qualities, as Roundneſs does from different Species of Figures; and is conſequently a new Quality in the ſame Sub-

ject, of a different kind or ſpecies from all the component Qualities conſider'd together: but Motion being a generical Power, does, I agree, conſiſt of the Motions of the Parts, as Figure does of the Figures of the Parts; and did Conſciouſneſs anſwer to Figure and Motion, that would likewiſe conſiſt of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts.

10. *Conſciouſneſs therefore being a real Quality* (Prop. 8.) *and of a kind ſpecifically different from all other Qualities, whether known or unknown, which are themſelves acknowledg'd to be void of Conſciouſneſs, can never poſſibly reſult from any compoſition of ſuch Qualities.*

Tho Conſciouſneſs be a real Quality, and different from all other Qualities, whether known or unknown, which are themſelves acknowledg'd to be void of Conſciouſneſs, it can or may reſult from ſuch Qualities as ſingly conſider'd are void of Conſciouſneſs. Roundneſs is a real Quality ſpecifically different from other Qualities void of Roundneſs, and yet may be the reſult or compoſition of ſuch Qualities. But in Mr. *Clark*'s ſenſe of real Qualities, I allow this Propoſition to be true: but then it reaches not the caſe of Conſciouſneſs, which I deny to be a generical Power, but affirm to be only a Mode of a generical Power.

11. *No individual Quality can be transfer'd from one Subject to another.*

This Propoſition I allow to be true: the Quality of a Subject can only be the Quality of that Subject wherein it exiſts, and not of another Subject. The Motion of a Syſtem of Matter can only be the Motion of that Syſtem. The Conſciouſneſs of any Being can only be the Conſciouſneſs of that particular Being. And I further

ther obſerve, that the Motion of a Syſtem of Matter one day can never be the Motion of the ſame numerical Syſtem the next day, nor the Conſciouſneſs of yeſterday be the ſame numerical Conſciouſneſs that I have to day, let the Being that is conſcious in me be diviſible or indiviſible. The ſame individual Quality can no more be transfer'd to the ſame *individual Subject* that was formerly the Subject of it, than it can be transfer'd to another Subject.

12. *The Spirits and Particles of the Brain, being looſe and in a perpetual flux, cannot therefore be the Seat of that Conſciouſneſs, by which a Man not only remembers things done many Years ſince, but alſo is conſcious that he himſelf, the ſame individual Being, was the Doer of them.*

Tho the Spirits or Particles of the Brain cannot by being in a perpetual flux be the Seat of that Conſciouſneſs, by which I know my ſelf to day to be the ſame individual conſcious Being that I was a year ago (for I deny that we have any Conſciouſneſs at all that we continue the ſame individual Being at different times) yet if it be not abſurd for Matter to think, Matter muſt at the ſame time know that it thinks, or be conſcious of its thinking: and if it can know at this inſtant that it thinks, I can ſee no reaſon why it may not remember to-morrow what it thinks of to-day, tho ſome Particles will be then wanting which it has at preſent. And if it can remember at all, then the memory of things may be continu'd even after we have loſt all the Particles of Matter that we had at the time of the doing them, by continual intermediate repeating, or imprinting afreſh our Ideas before they are quite loſt or worn out. And it is thus as intelligible to me that the memory of things ſhould be preſerv'd by a Being in a flux,

as

as by a Being that is not ſo. For the individual Conſciouſneſs to-day, can neither in an individual or diviſible Being be the individual Conſciouſneſs to-morrow: that Conſciouſneſs is a perfectly diſtinct Action in both Beings from the preceding Conſciouſneſs the day before. And whenever Mr. *Clark* accounts for an indiviſible Being's remembrance of an Action or Thought, I promiſe to account for Memory in a diviſible Being.

13. *The Conſciouſneſs that a Man has at one and the ſame time is one Conſciouſneſs, and not a multitude of diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes; as Solidity, Motion, or Colour of any Piece of Matter, is a multitude of diſtinct Solidities, Motions, or Colours.*

14. *Conſciouſneſs therefore cannot at all reſide in the ſubſtance of the Brain or Spirits, or in any other material Syſtem as its Subject, but muſt be a Quality of ſome immaterial Subſtance.*

Taking Conſciouſneſs for a numerical Power, either as anſwering to Roundneſs in a Body, or to a Motion peculiar to a Syſtem of Matter, and this Propoſition by no means follows from thoſe foregoing: For if Conſciouſneſs be a numerical Power, then it anſwers to never a one of the Heads under which he ranks the Powers of Matter; for it neither anſwers to an Effect reſiding in no Subject at all, (if there is any ſuch thing in Nature, which I utterly deny there is) nor does it anſwer to Sweetneſs, or any other ſenſible Qualities exiſting in Bodies external to us (for they are only Modes of Thinking or Perceptions in us, and exiſt not at all in thoſe external Bodies) Nor, laſtly, is it a Power which anſwers to Figure and Motion, which I agree conſiſt only in the Figures and Motions of the Parts, but agrees or anſwers to Modes of Figure and Motion.

tion. From all which it is plain, that all Mr. *Clark*'s Propoſitions are founded on his conſidering Conſciouſneſs to be ſomething elſe than what I contend it is; and ſo tho he may demonſtrate the Impoſſibility of Matter's being conſcious in his ſenſe of the term Conſciouſneſs, yet I deny that he has ſaid one word to prove the Impoſſibility of Matter's thinking in the ſenſe for which the term Conſciouſneſs ſtands with me, and I ſuppoſe with all thoſe that contend for the Poſſibility of Matter's thinking or being conſcious. So that his Demonſtration may be granted by me, without affecting the Queſtion between us, ſince it relates to a Chimera or Idea of his own framing; and thus endleſs Demonſtrations may be made, without underſtanding things as they really exiſt, or any Truth beſides the Relations of chimerical Ideas: For I grant his Demonſtration to be good, if Conſciouſneſs be conſider'd either as a generical Power like Motion and Figure, or as anſwering to the ſweetneſs of a Roſe, (which is a Senſation or Mode of thinking in us) or as an Effect reſiding in no Subſtance at all; then Conſciouſneſs cannot inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, and his Demonſtration reaches no farther. But Conſciouſneſs anſwering to never a one of theſe Powers, in demonſtrating that Conſciouſneſs in his ſenſe cannot inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, he has no more reach'd the Queſtion, than if he had talk'd of any thing elſe in the World: for his uſage of the term Conſciouſneſs does not make him one jot nearer the Queſtion, than if he had us'd a different term, or a term that no one would ſuſpect ſtood for the thing really ſignify'd by the term *Conſciouſneſs*.

15. *Difficulties that ariſe afterwards concerning other Qualities of that immaterial Subſtance, as whether*

ther it be extended or unextended, do not at all affect the present Argument.

How far the Difficulty of making immaterial Being extended, affects Mr. *Clark*'s Argument, I refer the Reader to Page 40, *&c.* of my *Reflections*. And as for the Difficulty of making it *unextended*, I will ſpeak to that whenever Mr. *Clark* defines the terms *Unextended* and *Being*, that I may ſee what they ſtand for when join'd together; and then I will ſhow how far conſidering immaterial Being to be an unextended Being affects his Argument, as I have ſhown how far conſidering immaterial Being to be an extended Being affects it.

Thus I have gone thro Mr. *Clark*'s Propoſitions, and ſhown wherein they fail to clear the Point that he ought to have aim'd at: and I conclude with this further Obſervation, that he has not drawn up one Propoſition to ſhow that his Argument is of any uſe to the ends and purpoſes of Religion, allowing it to be ever ſo true and juſt; and therefore for proof that it is of no uſe to that end, I refer the Reader to the 45th and the ſubſequent Pages of the foregoing *Reflections*.

FINIS.